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NO. 59 DECEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Moldovan Presidential Elections 
Driven by Insecurity Not Geopolitics 
President-elect Sandu May Have Found a Cure against Populism 
Dumitru Minzarari 
World media have hailed the victory of Maia Sandu in the Moldovan presidential elec-
tions on 15 November. They celebrated it as a triumph of democracy and pro-Western 
preferences over post-Soviet cronyism, authoritarianism and Russian apologists. The 
reality is more complex while there are few reasons for optimism. Sandu’s victory is a 
fragile one as the conditions that delivered it were temporary only. However, she may 
have unwittingly discovered how to attract voters who traditionally preferred Russia-
backed candidates. The EU would benefit by learning from this accidental solution, 
which is of value regionwide, and deriving from it a thought-out strategy to more 
effectively support and protect genuine democratic transformation in Moldova and 
the post-Soviet area. 
 
The good news is that Sandu’s victory is in-
deed transformative, at least to some extent, 
for both Moldova and the wider region. It is 
still unusual for a pure technocrat, schooled 
in the West, to win nationwide competitive 
elections against seasoned veterans of na-
tional politics and the incumbent by build-
ing a party from scratch in just a few years. 
The fact that Sandu won these elections as 
a woman in a country as conservative as 
Moldova is revealing of the ongoing social 
transformation in the region. Moreover, she 
won by a significant margin (57.72% vs 
42.28%) of votes against a candidate who 
had the financial and political backing of 
the Russian Federation. European Commis-
sion President Ursula von der Leyen and 
other EU officials have congratulated Sandu 
on her victory and offered EU support to 
advance reforms in Moldova. 
A Fragile Victory 
The bad news is the somewhat chance 
nature of this victory. There were several 
overlapping factors that favoured Sandu. 
One of them was the feud that the incum-
bent president, Igor Dodon, waged against 
Renato Usatîi, a relative newcomer to Mol-
dovan politics. Usatîi chipped away at 
Dodon’s support base of pro-Russian and 
conservative voters. His own party – 
Our Party – was affiliated with that of the 
nationalist Russian politician Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky. In a recent public appearance, 
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Zhirinovsky confirmed the affiliation and 
said that a phone call with the Kremlin had 
forced him to end any cooperation. 
Dodon used his connections in the 
Kremlin to put pressure on Usatîi to give up 
politics; Zhirinovsky criticized that, arguing 
that the Kremlin should have worked with 
both politicians. In response, Usatîi ran an 
aggressive campaign against Dodon, accus-
ing him of corruption. Coming from a poli-
tician affiliated with the West, that accu-
sation would not sound credible to Russian 
sympathizers. But it is a different case 
altogether when a pro-Russian politician 
makes the accusation. 
Usatîi would have discredited himself 
politically if he had asked his followers 
tovote for Dodon in the run-off, having 
demonized him earlier. He urged his sup-
porters to vote against Dodon, claiming 
pressure from the Russian intelligence 
services. Sergey Naryshkin, the head of 
Russia’s foreign intelligence service (SVR), 
appeared to substantiate that claim. He 
alleged that the West would seek to contest 
Dodon’s victory by inciting street protests 
and a “coloured revolution”. Making such 
an announcement was an extreme and un-
precedented public move by the SVR – one 
that confirmed it was backing Dodon. In the 
end, Usatîi’s impact on the elections was, in 
effect, to weaken Dodon, thereby increasing 
the credibility of Sandu’s campaign. 
Another factor that strongly contributed 
to Sandu’s victory was the aggressive rheto-
ric that Dodon short-sightedly used after the 
first round. The incumbent vocally attacked 
the diaspora, which he labelled a “parallel 
electorate”, for voting differently from 
the rest of the country – that is, largely for 
Sandu (70% vs 3.6%). This led to an unpre-
cedented mobilization of the Moldovan 
diaspora in the West. If some 150,000 voters 
went to polling stations outside Moldova 
on 1 November, more than 260,000 
people voted in the run-off two weeks later, 
largely for Sandu (~93%). The mobilization 
of Moldovans living abroad encouraged 
voting at home – indirectly benefiting 
Sandu – as voter turnout was considerably 
higher in the second round (Table 1). 
A third important factor that undermined 
Dodon’s chances of victory was Russia itself. 
As president, Dodon travelled repeatedly to 
Moscow. He routinely returned home with 
promises of economic assistance and trade 
facilitation for Moldova’s agricultural sec-
tor. Most of those promises were not kept. 
Every now and then, Moldovan media would 
report – similar to dispatches from the 
front about casualties – that more Moldo-
van agricultural products had been returned 
by the Russian authorities or destroyed. 
In fact, Russia President Vladimir Putin – 
usually a stickler for getting his facts right 
– recently stated that economically, Mol-
Table 
Comparative data on Moldova’s presidential elections in 2016 and 2020, 
number of validated votes 
Contenders 2016, I round 2020, I round 2016, II round 2020, II round 
Igor Dodon  680,550  439,866  834,081  690,615 
Maia Sandu  549,152  487,635  766,593  943,006 
Difference  131,398  –47,769  67,488  –252,391 
Renato Usatii  85,466*  227,939  –  – 
Violeta Ivanov  –  87,542  –  – 
Total voters  1,418,518  1,348,719  1,600,674  1,633,621 
* Contender was a member of Usatîi’s party 
Sources: Central Electoral Commission and the Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT). 
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dova is closely tied to Russia. The reality 
could not be more different. Data show that 
just over 8% of Moldovan exports went to 
Russia in 2019, more than 60% to EU coun-
tries and 27% to other countries. Thus, the 
Russian gate to prosperity is increasingly 
becoming a myth for the Moldovan people. 
If in 2019 the public largely perceived Rus-
sia as Moldova’s most important economic 
partner and the EU the second-most impor-
tant, the reverse was true in 2020. 
Winning over Conservatives 
and Populists 
There are strong reasons to believe that it is 
economics, not geopolitics, that determines 
how the Moldovan electorate largely votes. 
Voters assess the risk to their welfare posed 
by the candidates – linking them to Russia 
or the West as labels of convenience – in 
order to judge which might make them eco-
nomically better off. 
Nevertheless, the three factors listed 
above can easily turn to Sandu’s disadvan-
tage. Official data show that without the 
diaspora vote, Sandu had a shaky lead of 
27,000 votes (1.7%) among the home elec-
torate. This is despite her having successful-
ly attracted support from among Usatîi’s 
voter base – less than half of his more 
than 227,000 votes (the rest apparently 
voted for Dodon). She also received well 
over half of the more than 87,000 populist 
votes cast for Violeta Ivanov. 
Ivanov represents the Moldovan oligarch 
Ilan Șor, who fled the country amid credible 
accusations of involvement in embezzling 
US$1 billion in Moldovan budget funds. 
His supporters, mainly from the district and 
town of Orhei, where he once was mayor, 
revealed that they did not care whether Șor 
had stolen public money, just as long as he 
shared it. This indicates just how desperate-
ly many Moldovan citizens are seeking local 
solutions in order to survive. 
Maia Sandu’s victory was due mainly to 
her successfully addressing the concerns 
of parts of Șor’s populist electorate and 
Usatîi’s conservative one. It is the first time 
that a genuinely pro-European politician in 
Moldova – and one who is clearly perceived 
by voters as Western-affiliated – has been 
able to engage the traditionally conservative 
and even pro-Russian electorate. Surprisingly, 
she drew votes from Russian speakers, as 
can be seen from voting patterns. 
Sandu’s chosen strategy was to avoid 
the East-West geopolitical dichotomy and 
to focus instead on the everyday challenges 
the population faces – state corruption and 
the misappropriation of public goods – 
and it worked well for her. Indeed, a sizable 
segment of Moldovan voters appears less 
responsive to appeals for democracy and 
European integration. This not only sends 
a strong signal to Moldovan politicians; it 
also reveals to both the region and Moldo-
va’s Western partners that there is fatigue 
over value-based rhetoric and demand for 
value-based actions. 
To a certain degree, the democratic idea 
has been discredited by generations of Mol-
dovan politicians who have stolen and 
misused public goods under the slogan of 
democracy. But there is also a more instru-
mental explanation – namely, democracy 
has weak appeal to the critical mass of 
voters whose support Sandu needed to seal 
her victory. 
The level of national economic develop-
ment affects the social values and political 
preferences of the people. Western voters 
may prioritize individual freedoms over 
cheap food because in their country the 
latter is not in scarce supply. By contrast, 
voters in transition countries are likely to 
choose a strong leader or cheap food over 
individual freedoms if their country is fac-
ing political instability and economic hard-
ship. As people become more secure 
materially, the chances of their becoming 
cognitively autonomous and then socially 
independent increase. 
Furthermore, an audience tends to assess 
a speaker’s credibility based on a perceived 
commonality of interests or to what extent 
the speaker is trusted to represent its inter-
ests. After Usatîi had discredited Dodon as 
corrupt and not sharing the spoils, his sup-
porters lost confidence in the incumbent. 
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But why did a significant part of this con-
servative and populist group vote for Dodon 
nonetheless? Probably because of the dif-
ferent levels of risk aversion: the larger 
segment of Usatîi supporters who switched 
to Dodon was likely more risk-averse than 
the smaller segment that voted for Sandu. 
Even though the former knew that Dodon 
was corrupt, they continued to associate 
him with Russia owing to the Kremlin sig-
nals, including Putin’s endorsement. These 
voters viewed Sandu as posing an unknown 
risk and preferred to opt for the status quo 
by voting for Dodon. 
The insecurities of this electorate have 
been generated by Kremlin influence opera-
tions via the Russian-language media in 
Moldova. Russia has demonized the West 
–culturally and politically – claiming the 
threat of a NATO invasion, the unfreezing 
of the Transnistrian conflict and alleging 
that the EU has outlawed the terms “mother” 
and “father”. Election campaigners affili-
ated with Dodon and pro-Russian actors 
accused Sandu of being a lesbian, which 
does not sit well with the largely conserva-
tive Moldovan electorate. Many conserva-
tive voters were made to believe that Sandu 
is likely to opt for reunification with Roma-
nia, thereby giving up Moldovan statehood. 
Or they were manipulated into believing 
the false claim that Moldova depends eco-
nomically on Russia. But by addressing con-
crete concerns and risks rather than focus-
ing on their associated West-East labels, 
Sandu managed to ameliorate these insecu-
rities. Her newly won supporters were 
less worried about security risks and more 
attracted to the expected economic gains, 
which they perceived as more likely to 
materialize under a less corrupt president. 
This allowed Sandu to tap into Usatîi’s con-
servative and Șor’s populist voter base. 
Outlook 
While the presidential post is mainly of 
symbolic value in Moldova’s parliamentary 
system, it politically empowers the incum-
bent owing to the legitimacy endowed by 
the popular vote. Under the Constitution 
and other laws, the president is the com-
mander-in-chief of Moldova’s armed forces 
and has a considerable say in the country’s 
foreign and security policies, as well as the 
conditional right to dissolve the parliament. 
However, Dodon may still be able to under-
mine his successor through his control over 
the Socialist Party faction, which is the 
largest in the parliament. 
Moldova now provides an opportunity 
for the EU to start being a strategic “player 
rather than the playground”. The EU needs 
to understand that the political processes 
in its neighbourhood are subject to huge 
authoritarian pressure from Russia; no poli-
tician or party in the post-Soviet area can 
withstand that pressure alone and under-
take genuine democratic transformations. 
The fate of Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol 
Pashinyan, who is disliked by Russia, could 
easily be repeated in the case of Maia Sandu. 
Indeed, there is a high likelihood that Rus-
sia will use its leverage in Moldova to 
undermine Sandu and then try to replace 
her, as it did last year. 
The EU should throw its full support 
behind Sandu and thereby protect the cur-
rent opening towards genuine democratic 
transformation in Moldova. It needs to 
engage dynamically with the conservatives 
in Moldova at the grassroots, winning hearts 
and minds. Given Moldovans’ exposure to 
Russian disinformation, such engagement 
should address the fears among conserva-
tives, associated with Moldovan rapproche-
ment with the West. Ideally, this would 
be done through a number of EU targeted 
projects, carried out under the auspices of 
President Sandu, that address the insecuri-
ties and needs of the risk-averse electorate. 
A preliminary assessment would have to be 
conducted to identify and target the main 
insecurities so as to increase the impact of 
the projects. The underlying logic is that 
the greater the conservatives’ trust in the 
EU, the more likely they are to vote for 
local democratic politicians. These insights 
could be useful for EU work in other post-
Soviet countries as well. 
Dr Dumitru Minzarari is Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division at SWP. 
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